// Section 7.2 · Protocol
Enforcement (uptime-based, no slashing)
Uptime-based enforcement. No slashing.
// 7.2 · enforcement · liveness and validation, not seizure
Four enforcement mechanisms
// result validation plus uptime-weighted rewards
A result whose PoE hash does not reconstruct is rejected and the request is re-dispatched. The node earns no uptime credit for that work.
A sampled fraction of requests runs on a second node. A wrong-but-well-formed result is eliminated against the redundant run and the node is flagged.
A node that goes offline or fails validation stops accruing from the stream second by second. Its weight leaves the denominator and redistributes to online nodes; no principal is touched.
Persistent failure drops the node from the active set. Its reward weight goes to zero until it is healthy again. Stake is the operator's own locked capital, returned in full on unstake.
Three node states
// inactive (not staked) · idle (staked, offline) · active (staked, online)
A node is always in one of three states. Only one of them earns. The contract stores whether the stake is locked; the daily uptime the oracle reports decides idle versus active.
No stake locked. The node was never registered, or its stake was withdrawn. It carries no reward weight and earns nothing.
Staked and registered, but no machine is attached and online (uptime 0 for the day). Principal is locked and safe; reward weight is zero, so the node earns nothing. Staking alone does not earn.
Staked and a machine attached via the Node CLI is online and heartbeating. The node carries weight stake x tier and accrues from the live stream every block.
Why this works without slashing
// stake is a sybil cost and liveness collateral, not a slashable bond
Staking is permissionless from launch via `NodeRegistryLocker`: min 50,000 $PRLX variable stake, one stake to one node, unlimited nodes per wallet, 7-day unstake cooldown, principal always returned. Because the stake is the operator's own locked capital, it functions as a sybil cost and liveness collateral. Attacking the network forfeits future earnings while the attacker's stake sits idle.
Note·The deterrent is forfeited earnings, not seizure