// Chapter 05 · Protocol
The Proof Model
How strangers transact compute without a third party they both trust.
Four primitives, one guarantee
// 5.0 · what each binds, what each does not
Four cryptographic primitives carry the weight. None of them is novel. What matters is how they compose: each primitive binds one thing, and together they make a unit of work verifiable after the fact and tamper-evident in perpetuity.
// Binding matrix · 4 primitives × 2 axes
- 5.1SHA-256 commitmentresultthe computation was correct
- 5.2RSA signatureactorthe content of the signed message
- 5.3RSA encryptionchannelthe policy of what runs inside
- 5.4prev_hash linkagerecordwhether any logged result was correct
Proof-of-Execution
// 5.1 · the binding layer
// Key claim
The binding layer. Not honest computation.
PoE = SHA-256(task_id ‖ result ‖ node_id)A hash commitment. The network reconstructs the hash from the returned result, the known task_id, and the known node_id, then compares. Mismatches reject.
// PoE properties · binding · 2 entries
- // proves
A specific node returned a specific result for a specific task.
- // does not prove
That the computation was performed honestly without re-execution. Honesty is enforced out-of-band by sampled redundant re-dispatch (5.5) and by economic incentives via the staking contract.
- // 01node
Compute
node runs the unit of work locally
- // 02node
Commit
node SHA-256s (task ‖ result ‖ node)
- // 03node
Sign
node personal-signs the result
- // 04coord
Reconstruct
coord SHA-256 from canonical inputs
- // 05coord
Match
compare commitment to reconstruction
PoE v1 versus zero-knowledge
// 5.1 · what we shipped, what we have not
Real zero-knowledge proofs collapse binding and validation into one primitive. They are not deployed today because proof-generation cost for general-purpose compute runs orders of magnitude above the useful work itself. The research direction is to track the zkVM literature and migrate once the economics flip.
// PoE v1 · zero-knowledge · 9 axesdocumentation.md §5.1
- Cryptographic primitiveSHA-256 commitment over (task_id, result, node_id)zk-SNARK / zk-STARK over the program trace
- Proves binding (result to task)YesYes
- Proves honest computationNo · requires redundancy to detect liesYes · directly
- Verifier costOne hash reconstruction (microseconds)Proof verification (ms → s)
- Prover costNegligible · one hashHeavy · often greater than exec time
- Detects fabricated outputsOnly with sampled re-dispatchYes · every time
- Detects algorithm modificationOnly with sampled re-dispatchYes · every time
- Build statusAvailable at launchResearch direction
- Why nowCheap, fast, sufficient with the network + samplingReplaces redundancy once production-ready
Note·Why PoE v1 and not ZK now
The launch validator model
// 5.5 · hash check + sampled redundancy
At launch the coordination layer is the validator. Two checks run before settlement.
// At launch · validation pipelineshipping
- // 01
Hash-commitment reconstruction
Reconstruct SHA-256(task_id, result, node_id) and compare to the node's commitment. Mismatches reject outright.
- // 02
Sampled redundant re-dispatch
A configurable fraction of completed units, whole inference requests or general-path sub-tasks, dispatches to a second, independently selected node. Results compare. Disagreement triggers a third dispatch and a majority decision; persistent disagreement flags every party for review.
Caveat·Centralised validation is a known trade-off
Three supporting primitives
// 5.2 · 5.3 · 5.4 · authentication · encryption · records
// Primitive register · trust layerlive now
- // 5.2
RSA signature
· RSA-SIGNNodes register an RSA public key when they join. Every message a node emits is signed with the private key. The coordinator verifies against the registry. Unattributable returns are dropped.
- // 5.3
RSA encryption
· RSA-ENCPayloads dispatched to nodes, a whole inference request or a single general-path sub-task, are encrypted to the recipient node's RSA public key. Only that node can decrypt. Plaintext-in-transit is a configuration error, not an option.
- // 5.4
Immutable records
· HASH-CHAINValidated execution records anchor to the blockchain with previous_hash linkage. Any modification to a past record breaks the chain. The tamper-evidence property comes from the chain structure, not from zk machinery.
// Where to go next · reading path